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These days, nearly everyone has a cell phone. In the United States, there are
396 million cell phone service accounts for a nation of 326 million people.
Gone are the days of phone booths and home landlines. In the age of
smartphones, documents and records that were once  led safely away in the
drawers of our homes are carried with us everywhere we go. These little
devices contain our health and bank records, photos, location information,
music, and social media accounts. The nature and vast amount of
information stored on cell phones has begun to raise questions about
privacy and Fourth Amendment protections.
In a highly anticipated Supreme Court decision from this past June, the Court
updated Fourth Amendment protections for the digital era. In a 5-4 opinion
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authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court decided
Carpenter v. United States.
The case arises from a sequence of robberies in metro Detroit, Michigan, and
northern Ohio.  Ironically, the perpetrators were stealing cell phones—
robbing Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores at gunpoint and then  lling plaid
laundry bags full of smartphones.  The police arrested four men, including
Timothy Carpenter, who was then convicted and sentenced to 116 years in
prison.  Law enforcement was able to establish that Carpenter had been at
the crime scenes by obtaining over one hundred days of his smartphone
data records from Sprint and Metro PCS without a warrant.
Mr. Carpenter challenged this as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
 Though the Fourth Amendment never speci cally says “privacy,” it protects
citizens against unreasonable search and seizures without a warrant.
Carpenter argued that he has a privacy interest in the data he provides to his
cell phone company.  In the modern age, you cannot have a smart phone
without disclosing data. Because of this, Carpenter argued that the
government should have probable cause to be able to search it.
Law enforcement o cers were able to get access to Carpenter’s records
under the Stored Communications Act of 1986.  This Act “[a]llows phone
companies to disclose records when the government provides them with
speci c and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the records are relevant and material to an ongoing
investigation.”  The act essentially allows third parties to disclose relevant
information to the police without a warrant.
This was, in essence, the government’s argument— that information you
reveal to third parties is public and the police do not need a warrant to seize
it.  The third-party doctrine was  rst established in 1976 and is a legal
principle allowing information that customers provide to a third party, like a
bank, to be disclosed to the police.  The principle was expanded three years
later to include call records collected by phone companies.
Though the court was split, the majority concluded that the government’s
search of Carpenter’s phone was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and
declined to give the state unrestricted access to cell carrier’s physical
location data.  Chief Justice John Roberts stated, “In light of the deeply
revealing nature of [cell-site location information], its depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its
collection, the fact that that such information is gathered by a third party
does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”  He
differentiated between cell phone data and other types of third party data,

















witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and
goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.”
This is a win for digital privacy, but it is unclear what this ruling might mean
for other forms of government surveillance.  Roberts kept his decision
narrow in scope, not “call[ing] into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools,”  “other business records that might incidentally
reveal location information[,]”  or “other collection techniques involving . . .
national security.”  Though it is a narrow holding, this case is a win for
digital privacy and will establish the law in this area going forward.
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